When it comes into force, it has the potential to dwarf the CBD in its relevance to the intersection of intellectual property and biodiversity.
This article focuses on the United Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), concluded on 5 June 1992 at the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit. 4 The CBD is a multilateral convention. As of the writing of this paper, 180 parties have ratified it. The
European Union and all of its member states are parties to the CBD. President Clinton signed the Convention, but the United States has not ratified it. President Clinton submitted the Convention to the US Senate as is required under the US Constitution, but the Senate did not consent to it. President Bush has no interest in promoting the CBD.
The CBD is not designed as an agreement to define intellectual property rights. Rather, it
is an agreement to conserve global biodiversity. To the extent that it says anything about intellectual property, it is in the context of its primary mission of trying to "mediate competing claims of industrialized and developing states." 5 The CBD states its three main objectives as: (i) the conservation of biological diversity; (ii) the sustainable use of the components of biological diversity; and (iii) the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. 6 Genetic resources are "genetic material of actual or potential value." 7 It is in the third objective, the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from plant genetic resources, for which intellectual property concerns are of primary relevance.
The regulation of intellectual property rights in resources associated with biodiversity is a major issue of global concern. It would be difficult to challenge the argument that no other category of legal rules affects the distribution of wealth more than property rules. The enclosure of the intellectual commons is occurring in various areas of science and technology, including in information technology and cyberspace, and in biotechnology relating to pharmaceuticals, medicine and human genetics. Property rights and agriculture share a longstanding historical relationship. The endowments of any society are vitally connected to agriculture because agriculture is about food production. The political economics of British agriculture in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries produced the so-called first enclosure movement, in which commons in agricultural lands areas were enclosed and the rights of small farmers in estates such as copyholds were expropriated. 8 While the conflict in the first enclosure movement was over rights in real property, the conflict in the second enclosure movement is rights in intellectual property. 9 Similes and metaphors abound in the literature. We are in the process of the "enclosure of the intangible commons of the mind" and the "intellectual land grab." 10 The battle for rights in intellectual property is "an information arms race with multiple sides battling for larger shares of the global knowledge pool."
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Evidence of the salience of the topic can be found in the fact that as this article is written, the CBD parties are meeting in Montreal to discuss the role of the CBD in the preservation of traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities. The delegates are examining, among other things, "knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity," 12 guidelines for conducting cultural, environmental and social impact assessments of development on sacred sites and on land that indigenous and local communities have traditionally used or occupied, and methods for increasing indigenous and local community participation in decision making concerning policies affecting traditional knowledge.
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The organization of this article is as follows. Part I explains what biodiversity is, in brief terms. Part II summarizes why it is important. Part III examines the main CBD articles relevant to intellectual property. Part IV explores how the CBD differs from other treaty regimes that deal with intellectual property. Part IV characterizes international agreements that deal with intellectual property and biodiversity as either property-oriented or commons oriented.
I. WHAT IS BIODIVERSITY?
There are many definitions of biodiversity. Biodiversity is short for biological diversity.
CBD Article 2 defines biological diversity as "the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems." 14 In its 1992 Global Biodiversity Strategy, the World Resources Institute of the World Conservation Union and United Nations Environment Programme defines biodiversity as "the totality of genes, species, and ecosystems in a region." 15 There are thus three "hierarchical categories" to which the "diversity" label affixes: diversity of genes, diversity of species and diversity of ecosystems.
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Genetic diversity "refers to the variation of genes within species." 17 It includes "distinct populations of the same species (such as the thousands of traditional rice varieties in India) or genetic variation within a population (high among Indian rhinos, and very low among cheetahs)." 18 An example of genetic diversity in California are genetic differences in Douglas fir along the coast as opposed to those found in the Sierra mountains. Firs exhibit genetic adaptations to local conditions such as the summer fog along the coast or hot summer days in the Sierra. 19 Same species -Douglas fir -but genetically different.
Species diversity "refers to the variety of species within a region." 20 Scientists use various measures to assess species diversity, such as "species richness" or a more precise measurement, "taxonomic diversity", which also considers the relationship between species. The
World Resources Institutes provides as an example of taxonomic diversity, "an island with two species of birds and one species of lizard has a greater taxonomic diversity than an island with Though the answer to this question seems self evident, it is not. The reasons are mired in politics. Legal rules alone do not provide answers. I provide a way of conceptualizing reasons offered for or against biodiversity conservation. Relying on moral philosophy, the reasons fall into three categories: consequentialist, deontological and virtue ethical. I provide here summary and perhaps over simplistic illustrations of how these three approaches work to answer the question why biodiversity preservation is or is not important. These methods are not totally distinct from each other, but are presented here as stark contrasts in order to explain their differences. In addition, there is plenty of political philosophy that provides other ways of examining the issues. 24 Consequentialist thinking about biodiversity (or anything else, for that matter) concerns itself with the effects of given states of affairs. A consequentialist is willing to weigh tradeoffs or to engage in cost-benefit analysis. Utilitarianism and economics are consequential approaches to inquiring about public policy.
To the economist, the question is one of weighing costs and benefits to reach an efficient collective choice. An economist asks the question whether the social benefits of preserving a particular gene sequence, species or ecosystem outweigh its social costs. If the social costs associated with the preservation of a particular rare chaparral are greater than the social benefits from destroying a range the chaparral to build badly needed housing in southern California, then, from an economic point of view, it would be more efficient to build the houses and destroy the chaparral. Most economists argue that cost-benefit analysis is a tool for positive analysis and at most a decision procedure to help governments take decisions. To the economist, the actual decision is political and beyond the realm of the economics.
There are various approaches to utilitarianism but the utilitarian asks a question similar to that of the economist: which choice -the houses or the chaparral -produce the most happiness in society? From a Benthamite perspective of pleasures and pains, which collective choice yields the greatest pleasure and the least pain? Here, we might get the same result as the economist, though this is not always the case.
A deontologist might find the above analysis unacceptable. A deontological approach is one that we might find a nongovernmental organization or an ecologist taking. To a deontologist, it is morally or ethically wrong to destroy a rare plant species, regardless of the consequences. We have a duty to protect rare plant species, and it is wrong to destroy them.
That a substantial community of humans may benefit from the destruction of habitat is irrelevant.
Environmental deontologists do not carry the day in most governments and international institutions, as the managerial approach of cost-benefit analysis tends to be more influential, particularly because politicians must answer to voters.
Virtue ethics is a revival of the Aristotelian approach to ethics, to looking at properties of character, such as courage, temperance, prudence and justice. Applying virtue ethics in the public realm, to produce a so-called "public morality" has encountered some difficulties, but so have utilitarianism and deontology. 25 27 The "intrinsic value" of biological diversity suggests a deontological approach while the remainder of the paragraph, with its reference to values external to biological diversity suggest a consequentialist approach. This is a common way of expressing values about biodiversity. One commentator expresses the value of biodiversity in consequential terms in this way:
Biological diversity is important because it is a repository of genetic information gained through long processes of biological evolution. Biological diversity is valued both for its potential use (for instance, as a source of new drugs or crops) and for its aesthetic contribution. The value derived from biological diversity (for instance, cancer-curing drugs and disease-resistant crops) far exceeds the world investment in conservation. 28 On the other hand, the language in the CBD on "fair and equitable" sharing of benefits arising from the use of biological diversity suggests a virtue ethical or deontological approach, looking to concepts of justice in determining sharing allocations. 29 It is the clash of choices -between fairness in sharing the benefits of the use of biodiversity and maximizing use -that can create the interesting problems. If we only take into account how we can put biodiversity to its greatest use, then we will permit large multinational corporations to use traditional knowledge developed over centuries by indigenous communities to develop patented technologies without paying any compensation to the indigenous community, since a greater good -say cheap medicine or a virus-resistant corn -may produce benefits that far outweigh any losses to the indigenous community. It would be worth examining this point using the Rawlsian difference principle. 30 Indeed, in the absence of destruction of endangered genetic resources, we could argue that the indigenous community has suffered no loss if it is still able to use its traditional knowledge in the same way as before, unless we are willing to count foregone opportunity costs as a loss, even where the community could not convert the traditional knowledge to a patentable innovation without the assistance of the multinational. More empirical work needs to be done in order to come up with proper conclusions using the framework set forth above. I have taken only a tentative and general step. The main concern, however, seems more connected to environmental regulation than intellectual property law: the destruction of plant genetic resources as a result of urbanization and other socio-economic conditions may reduce the availability of genetic resources for innovation in the form of intellectual property.
III. THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY

A. Introduction
Nations began negotiations in earnest for a global biodiversity convention in earnest in 1991. 31 These negotiations began one year before the planned United Nations Conference on Environment and Development "Earth Summit" in Rio, held in June 1992. 32 One of the major agreements signed at Rio 1992 was the CBD. The CBD went into force on 10 July 1996, with the ratification of Cyprus as the thirtieth party to ratify, accede or approve the Convention. 33 Intellectual property falls with the scope of the CBD but it is clearly not the only subject of concern. One of the more recent and notable developments in CBD governance was the adoption of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
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The Protocol came into force on 11
September 2003. The Protocol regulates international trade in genetically modified organisms.
It is a key treaty instrument in the pending WTO dispute settlement proceeding that the United
States, Canada and Argentina have brought against the EU. One of the EU's main defenses will likely be that its actions to restrict the importation of genetically modified foods were designed to comply with the Cartagena Protocol. We may thus see a question with serious implications before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body as to the consistency of multilateral trade agreements with a multilateral environmental agreement. Notably, Argentina, Canada, and the United States are not parties to the Cartagena Protocol. The pending dispute before the WTO has nothing to do with intellectual property.
B. The Intellectual Property Provisions
The CBD is comprised of forty-two articles and two annexes. This part explains the parts of the Convention relevant to intellectual property.
The Preamble sets forth the values underlying the Convention. As explained above, the the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding.
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These provisions inform the remaining articles of the Convention on intellectual property, as will be shown below.
Traditional knowledge is not a legally recognized form of intellectual property in its own right. In Article 8, dealing with in-situ conservation, 40 Article 8(j) sets forth a provision on traditional knowledge. It provides that CBD contracting parties "shall, as far as possible and appropriate" and subject to national legislation:
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices. The primary obligations of countries rich in biodiversity, such as developing countries, are to provide access, and Article 15 identifies the characteristics of the laws and institutions to regulate such access. 43 For those countries whose persons obtain access, Article 16 identifies the characteristics of the laws and institutions to regulate the transfer of technological innovation to the countries from which the genetic resources are obtained. 44 The CBD takes a top-down state- 59 The Guidelines are just that -guidelines -they are voluntary and do not set forth the kind of mandatory language that lawyers place in instruments. Many of the contracting parties are developing countries, rich in biodiversity but poor in institutional capabilities needed to manage biodiversity in a sustainable way. The Bonn Guidelines essentially seek to provide details to national governments on how to implement the above CBD articles relevant to intellectual property. The Guidelines more clearly define the kinds of roles that national bodies may take in implementing the CBD provisions on access and benefit sharing.
They make recommendations that are designed to make governments more attuned to stakeholder interests. Brief discussion of the Guidelines is set forth here.
One of the major tasks governments face in implementing the CBD is in producing a set of institutions for implementing the prior informed consent requirement of CBD Article 15.5.
The Bonn Guidelines deal with this issue. They recommend the "basic principles of a prior informed consent system, which include "legal certainty and clarity," "access to genetic resources . . . at minimum cost," transparency in restrictions on access to genetic resources and the basing of such restrictions on "legal grounds," and "[t]he consent of relevant stakeholders, such as indigenous and local communities, as appropriate to the circumstances and subject to domestic law. . . ." 60 The Guidelines list the elements of a prior informed consent system as including the various kinds of features of a public institution that relate to natural justice or due process. 61 They recommend procedures for the application process for prior informed consent.
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Another major task that governments face in implementing the CBD is in coming up with a set of "mutually agreed terms" for access to genetic resources within their borders, as CBD Article 15.7 mandates. The Guidelines recommend basic requirements for mutually agreed terms, such as the development of standard form agreements and procedures for efficient negotiation of agreements. 63 The Guidelines recommend "minimization of transaction costs" through the undertaking of efforts to promote awareness of "the Government's and relevant stakeholders' requirements for prior informed consent and contractual arrangements, of "existing mechanisms for applying for access, entering into arrangements and ensuring the sharing of benefits."
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Transaction costs could be further minimized by developing "framework agreements, under which repeat access under expedited arrangements can be made; and "standardized material transfer agreements and benefit-sharing arrangements for similar resources and similar uses." 65 Appendix I of the Guidelines sets forth "suggested elements" for such an agreement.
The Guidelines further provide an "indicative list of typical mutually agreed terms," which include the following:
a. Type and quantity of genetic resources, and the geographical/ecological area of activity; b.
Any limitations on the possible use of the material; c.
Recognition of the sovereign rights of the country of origin; d.
Capacity-building in various areas to be identified in the agreement; e.
A clause on whether the terms of the agreement in certain circumstances (e.g. change of use) can be renegotiated; f.
Whether the genetic resources can be transferred to third parties and conditions to be imposed in such cases, e.g. whether or not to pass genetic resources to third parties without ensuring that the third parties enter into similar agreements except for taxonomic and systematic research that is not related to commercialization; g.
Whether the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities have been respected, preserved and maintained, and whether the customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional practices has been protected and encouraged; h. Treatment of confidential information; i.
Provisions regarding the sharing of benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources and their derivatives and products. under fair and most favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms where agreed, in particular, knowledge and technology that make use of genetic resources, including biotechnology, or that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable utilization of biological diversity; g. Strengthening capacities for technology transfer to user developing country Parties and to Parties that are countries with economies in transition and technology development in the country of origin that provides genetic resources. Also to facilitate abilities of indigenous and local communities to conserve and sustainably use their genetic resources; h. Institutional capacity-building; i. Human and material resources to strengthen the capacities for the administration and enforcement of access regulations; j. Training related to genetic resources with the full participation of providing Parties, and where possible, in such Parties; k. Access to scientific information relevant to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, including biological inventories and taxonomic studies; l. Contributions to the local economy; m. Research directed towards priority needs, such as health and food security, taking into account domestic uses of genetic resources in provider countries; n. Institutional and professional relationships that can arise from an access and benefit-sharing agreement and subsequent collaborative activities; o. Food and livelihood security benefits; p. Social recognition; q. Joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights. 68 Note that "joint ownership of intellectual property rights" is the last on the latter two lists.
The Guidelines admit to a foundation premise of the CBD, that an intellectual property rights regime need not be the only way to allocate the benefits of biodiversity.
Finally, the Bonn Guidelines recommend that national patent offices require disclosure of the country of origin of genetic resources and of "traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and location communities." 69 How this recommendation will work itself out within the CBD institutions remains to be seen.
IV. COMPARING THE CBD TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: DIVERGENT MODELS OF TREATY GOVERNANCE
As should be evident, the CBD is not an intellectual property treaty. It does not even say that intellectual property rights have to be granted to stakeholders in developing countries, even if they developed the traditional knowledge that led to the discovery that is being A.
Property-Oriented Agreements
TRIPS
TRIPS is one of the most important international agreements relevant to the allocation of rights in genetic resources in biodiversity. Although an agreement that is supposed to regulate international trade, it specifies substantive standards for the intellectual property laws of the WTO members. It is unlike any other trade agreement preceding it, unlike anything produced in the GATT/WTO framework since the GATT's humble beginnings as a provisional agreement to regulate tariffs. 70 TRIPS harmonizes intellectual property protection at a high level of protection for rights holders, and this is one of its controversial characteristics. Another is that it shifts the locus of international regulation of intellectual property rights to the WTO from other international regulatory regimes, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a United Nations organization, and the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties in Plants. 71 The key TRIPS provision relevant to intellectual property rights in biodiversity is Article 27, entitled "Patentable Subject Matter." Article 27 provides that patents "shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application." 72 WTO members must make patents available in their territories "without discrimination . . . as to the field of technology."
Three exceptions exist to this "any technology" standard for patentability. Article 27.2 provides that WTO members may exclude from patentability inventions, "the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law." 74 Article 27.3 provides that members may exclude from patentability (a) "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals" and (b)
"plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes."
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Further, under subparagraph (b), WTO members may provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents, or by an "effective sui generis system" or by a combination of the two methods.
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One of the basic distinctions between sui generis protection and patents is that sui generis rights tend to be subject to various exemptions, such as a research exemption such exceptions.
They would fall, at least implicitly, within the sui generis category of protection permitted under European patents shall not be granted in respect of:
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to "ordre public" or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States; (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals; this provision does not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof. prohibits the grant of patents in Europe whose invention, publication and exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality. The agreements that more specifically deal with plant genetic resources are to be contrasted with the traditional international agreements that deal with intellectual property.
These former agreements are managed by the FAO. They were, initially, the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, a nonbinding agreement that will, subsequently, be superseded by the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. The basics of these agreements are discussed here.
The first of these agreements, the International Undertaking, was the principal instrument within the FAO system for the regulation of intellectual property rights in plant genetic resources, until the International Treaty was signed. 88 The This presented a set of property rules in which plant genetic resources that were not worked by breeders were commons property free for the taking, while plant genetic resources that were worked into a breeder's right enjoyed protection. 92 Throughout the world, farmers and their communities have developed a vast portfolio of genetic diversity within crops and other plant species, which form the raw material for all agricultural activity. Modern plant breeding, in fact, builds on plant germplasm resources that have been traditionally developed and donated by farmers. Over the millennia, crops have been shared between regions, so that all countries are now interdependent, in that they rely for agriculture and food security, on crops that are cultivated elsewhere. 94 The International Treaty grew from the International Undertaking and seven years of negotiations. Signed in November 2001, it has yet to come into force. It will come into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 95 As of the date of this writing, the FAO has received thirty-three instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, 96 so the Treaty is likely to come into force soon. The Treaty has the potential to become the most important among the array of agreements that deal with intellectual property and biodiversity, though its first article identifies the need for integration with the CBD.
The objectives of the Treaty include "the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising" from the use of plant genetic resources, "in harmony with" the CBD. 97 Treaty objectives "will be attained by closely linking" the Treaty to the CBD. 98 Commentators have described the "most noteworthy feature" of the International Treaty, 99 its "central achievement," 100 its "multilateral system." The multilateral system is the key access provision of the International Treaty. The multilateral system provides for "facilitated access" to plant genetic resources. The relevant plant genetic resources are comprised of a list of key food and feed crops, identified in Annex 1 to the International Treaty. The genetic resources for these crops are held in seed banks. Private persons have access to the plant materials for the crops on the list, but if they commercialize products from the materials they must pay a percentage of profits to a trust account, and the trust funds must be used for fair and equitable benefit sharing through "information exchange, technology transfer, capacity building and allocation of monetary benefits from commercialization." 101 The details are suppressed here in the interests of brevity, including the requirements of material transfer agreements, 102 but one more point bears mention. Article 12.3(d) provides that access is conditioned on the following: "Recipients shall not claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or components, in the form received from the Multilateral System." 103 The scope of this language will be one of the more interesting questions for implementation once the Treaty is in force. What is the goal? The answer to this question will determine one's position on the subject. If one's goal is to conserve biodiversity so that we can use it to maximize human welfare, then one might be more inclined to grant intellectual property rights and not worry too much about indigenous communities. If we were to adopt an economic approach (a kind of consequentialism), then we would ask how we would maximize the benefits of biodiversity at the point where social benefits equal social costs. In this economic calculus, we may be willing to sacrifice some biodiversity, if the cost of preserving it exceeds the benefits of preservation.
CONCLUSION
Deontologists object to these approaches, claiming that it is morally wrong to use technologies developed by others without compensation, and that it is wrong to harm biodiversity to make humans who happen to live in this time period better off. These sorts of questions are of a threshold nature and must be dealt with before we attempt serious answers to the question whether or not intellectual property rights are advantageous or not.
What we do know at this point is that there are a variety of sometimes competing and sometimes coordinating international arrangements that say various things about intellectual property rights and biodiversity. Though it would seem that the trend is towards commercialization and more property rights, 105 it remains to be seen whether the CBD and the
